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DEFAMATION AND THE ART OF BACKFIRE 
 
TRUDA GRAY AND BRIAN MARTIN∗ 
 
[Legal discussions of defamation commonly focus on defamation law, with 
relative neglect of struggles that take place over defamation matters. To 
understand defamation struggles, we introduce backfire theory: if something 
is perceived as unjust and information about it is communicated to relevant 
audiences, it has the potential to backfire against those held responsible. 
Defamation suits have the potential to backfire when they are seen as 
oppressive or contrary to free speech. There are several types of actions by 
plaintiffs that can inhibit this backfire effect, including cover-up, devaluation 
of the defendant, reinterpretation and intimidation. To illustrate the value of 
backfire analysis of defamation struggles, we examine four Australian 
examples, involving author Avon Lovell, politician Robert Askin, solicitor 
John Marsden and Aboriginal leader Geoff Clark, and the British example of 
McDonald’s suit against two activists. Participants in these struggles see the 
matters in terms of reputation and free speech; backfire analysis allows an 
observer to put tactics used by participants in a coherent framework.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The standard perspective on defamation law is that it is an attempt to balance 
the protection of two contrary values, reputation and free speech. On the one 
hand, defamation actions serve to penalise those who make inaccurate and 
malicious assaults on a person’s reputation and to provide recompense to 
those whose reputations are unfairly tarnished. On the other, defamation laws 
must not be so restrictive that they restrain free speech, including public 
debate and investigative journalism that are essential for a well functioning 
democracy. This perspective frames most legal writings about defamation, 
which deal with facets of defamation law, the trajectories of particular cases,  
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possibilities for law reform and the uses and abuses of defamation law for 
protecting reputations and hindering free speech. 
 
This focus on the law of defamation is useful, but has the effect of diverting 
attention from a more practical matter: how struggles over reputation and over 
free speech are carried out; in particular how to understand the dynamics of 
such struggles. We use the word ‘struggle’ to signal that more is involved than 
matters of reputation, free speech and the law. Defamation issues are matters 
also of power, including the opportunity to publish one’s views to mass 
audiences, the economic resources to pursue or defend legal actions, the social 
power to mobilise support and wage campaigns, and the coercive power to 
intimidate opponents. 
 
We analyse defamation struggles using a different approach. We start with the 
observation that a defamation action can rebound against the plaintiff when it 
is perceived as unjust and information about it is widely communicated to 
relevant audiences, causing outrage. Such an outcome can be termed a 
backfire. Plaintiffs often take actions that inhibit outrage; defendants 
sometimes act in ways that amplify it. We use the term ‘outrage’ to refer to 
adverse reactions by individuals against something perceived as unjust or a 
norm violation. Thus the term outrage is a surrogate for various emotions 
including anger, disgust, disquiet and concern. We use the term ‘backfire’ to 
refer to the process by which outrage is turned into expression or action 
against whoever or whatever is perceived as responsible for the perceived 
injustice. 
 
In the next section, we discuss backfire dynamics, first outlining its use in 
other fields and then how it can be applied to defamation. We next apply the 
backfire framework to several public cases involving actual or potential 
defamation suits. We conclude with comments on the implications of this 
approach to defamation matters. 
 
II THE DYNAMICS OF BACKFIRE 
 
In a confrontation between protestors and heavily armed police, it might seem 
that the police inevitably have an overwhelming advantage in terms of 
imposing their will. In many situations this is true, but sometimes the actions 
of the police can rebound against them. If the protestors are seen to be 
peaceful and non-threatening, and the actions of the police excessive, this can 
mobilise greater support for the protestors, cause outrage among previously 
neutral observers and even cause concern among some of the police. 
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A number of famous historical cases follow this pattern. In 1930, as part of 
the Indian independence struggle, Gandhi led what has been called the salt 
satyagraha, beginning with a march to the sea to produce salt in defiance of 
the British salt monopoly. During raids following the march, activists came 
forward and, without resisting, suffered brutal beatings by the police. This 
dramatic confrontation was reported by a US journalist, causing outrage 
worldwide and greatly weakening the credibility of British rule.1 
 
In 1960 in South Africa, during nationwide protests against the government’s 
pass laws, white police opened fire on the crowd in the town of Sharpeville, 
killing perhaps a hundred black Africans. The story, accompanied by photos 
taken by visiting journalists, produced headlines internationally and triggered 
a great increase in opposition to apartheid.2 
 
In 1991 in Dili, the capital of East Timor, then occupied by Indonesia, troops 
opened fire on protestors at a funeral. The atrocity was witnessed by several 
western journalists and captured on videotape, which was later broadcast 
internationally. The Dili massacre led to a massive increase in international 
support for the East Timor independence movement.3 
 
Nonviolence researcher Gene Sharp, who studied hundreds of campaigns, 
found this sort of reaction to attacks on nonviolent protesters to be such a 
regular occurrence that he included it as one of the stages in what he called 
‘the dynamics of nonviolent action’. Sharp called this effect ‘political jiu-
jitsu’ by analogy with the sport of jiu-jitsu in which the force of the opponent 
is used against them.4 The concept of backfire is a generalisation of political 
jiu-jitsu beyond the field of nonviolent action. 
 
In each of the cases mentioned, there appear to be two preconditions: a 
perceived injustice, namely brutal force against peaceful protestors, and 
communication to significant third party audiences. Although some attacks on 
nonviolent protestors rebound against the attackers, most do not. For example, 
there were many earlier atrocities in East Timor that attracted little attention. 
What actions by attackers are likely to inhibit outrage? By examining a range  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Thomas Weber, On the Salt March (1997). 
2 Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and its Massacre (2001). 
3 Arnold S Kohen, From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of 
East Timor (1999). 
4 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973) 657. 
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of cases, we can observe several types of methods that reduce or eliminate 
outrage. This approach to the issue is a form of grounded theory.5 
 
The main methods used that inhibit outrage can be classified into five 
categories: 
 
(1) Cover-up; 
(2) Devaluation of the target; 
(3) Reinterpretation of what happened; 
(4) The use of official procedures to give an appearance of justice; 
(5) Intimidation and bribery. 
 
For example in the Sharpeville massacre,6 (1) police removed evidence that 
anti-personnel ‘dumdum’ bullets had been used, including destroying 
evidence of police stocks and removing bodies showing the characteristic 
damage from these bullets; (2) police and most of the white population in 
South Africa considered blacks to be inferior; (3) police claimed the crowd 
was menacing, whereas other observers had noted a playful mood; (4) the 
government immediately set up an official inquiry into the massacre, designed 
to be sympathetic to the government line but not too obviously subservient; 
(5) police, just after the massacre, arrested and threatened local activists, so 
few were willing to testify to the official inquiry, while the government 
declared a state of emergency. These actions dampened outrage from within 
both the black and the white South African communities, but were unable to 
prevent a huge international reaction to the massacre. This was principally 
because information about the events got out of the country and the 
international audience was not strongly influenced by the methods of 
devaluation, reinterpretation, legitimation by official inquiry, and 
intimidation. 
 
Most or all of these five methods of inhibiting outrage are found not only in 
violent attacks against peaceful protestors but also in a wide range of other 
issues, including censorship,7 whistleblowing,8 dismissal of academics,9 
police beatings,10 torture,11 and invasion of other countries such as Iraq.12 
                                                 
5 Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research (1967). 
6 Frankel, above n 2. 
7 Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin, ‘Making Censorship Backfire’ (July 2003) 7 
Counterpoise 5; Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin, ‘Exposing and Opposing 
Censorship: Backfire Dynamics in Freedom-of-speech Struggles’ (2004) 10 Pacific 
Journalism Review 29. 
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The common characteristic in these cases is a perceived injustice or a 
violation of a social norm. Violent attacks on peaceful protestors are widely 
seen as unjust; likewise, censorship is a violation of freedom of expression, a 
widely valued norm (at least in some societies), and a military attack on a 
non-threatening opponent is a violation of norms for international behaviour. 
 
If perpetrators may employ these five major methods for inhibiting outrage, 
then targets have available corresponding avenues for countering the 
inhibition, for example by (1) exposing the action; (2) demonstrating the value 
of the target; (3) giving their own interpretation of events; (4) avoiding or 
discrediting official channels that give only an illusion of justice; (5) resisting 
and exposing intimidation and bribery. 
 
Note that we are primarily concerned with perceived injustices and norm 
violations by powerful groups against those less powerful. Powerful groups 
have the capacity to inhibit outrage, at least in some cases. The opposite 
situation, in which a relatively powerless individual attacks a powerful group, 
almost inevitably backfires. For example, a man who randomly opens fire on 
his bosses seldom receives much sympathy and is unlikely to be able to draw 
on any of the five methods of inhibiting outrage. 
 
This analysis, with a few modifications, can readily be applied to defamation. 
Suing for defamation can backfire if it is seen as oppressive or unjust - in 
particular as a threat to free speech - and if information about it is 
communicated to significant audiences. Consider in this regard the five main 
methods of inhibition: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
8 Brian Martin with Will Rifkin, ‘The Dynamics of Employee Dissent: 
Whistleblowers and Organisational Jiu-jitsu’ (2004) 4 Public Organisation Review 
221. 
9 Brian Martin, ‘The Richardson Dismissal as an Academic Boomerang’ in Kenneth 
Westhues (ed), Workplace Mobbing in Academe: Reports from Twenty Universities 
(2004) 317; Brian Martin, ‘Boomerangs of Academic Freedom’ (June 2005) 6.2 
Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor, available at 
http://www.cust.educ.ubc.ca/workplace/issue6p2/steele.htm. 
10 Brian Martin, ‘The Beating of Rodney King: The Dynamics of Backfire’ (2005) 13 
Critical Criminology 307. 
11 Brian Martin and Steve Wright, ‘Countershock: Mobilising Resistance to 
Electroshock Weapons’ (2003) 19 Medicine, Conflict and Survival 205. 
12 Brian Martin, ‘Iraq Attack Backfire’ (17 April 2004) 39 Economic and Political 
Weekly 1577. 
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(1) Cover-up. Plaintiffs seldom publicise their actions; in offering a 
settlement, they often require defendants to sign a silencing clause.  
(2) Defence lawyers commonly advise against seeking publicity, due to 
the risk of alienating the judge or of this being seen as evidence of 
malice. 
(3) Devaluation of the target. Defamation law encourages denigration of 
the defendant to overcome claims made by the defence such as 
reasonableness and absence of malice.13 
(4) Reinterpretation. Plaintiffs describe their purpose as defence of 
reputation, not suppression of free expression. 
(5) Official channels. Plaintiffs use the law as a means of attack. The 
complexity and slowness of defamation law make it difficult to 
mobilise outrage against such attacks. 
(6) Intimidation and bribery. Plaintiffs’ threats and legal actions often 
intimidate defendants, while offers of settlement can operate like 
bribes. 
 
In the analysis of defamation actions using the backfire model, there is one 
distinct difference from other applications. In the Sharpeville massacre and 
other such attacks, formal inquiries are commonly set up to defuse outrage by 
giving the appearance of justice. But in the case of defamation actions, official 
channels — namely the legal system — constitute the very means by which 
the attack is launched. The existence of defamation law gives, in advance, a 
degree of legitimacy to a certain category of threat to free expression. 
 
III CASE STUDIES 
 
We now apply backfire analysis to several cases. The first case, Lovell, 
involved numerous defamation actions to prevent publication. The second, 
Askin, involved an implicit threat to sue media. The third, Marsden, involved 
a solicitor suing a television station. The fourth, Clark, involved a prominent 
person who, defamed in the media, decided not to sue. Finally, we describe 
the McLibel case, the most prominent case of backfire from a defamation 
action. There are other cases that can be readily analysed using the backfire 
model.14 
                                                 
13 We thank Greg Ogle (personal communication, 10 November 2004) for this point. 
14 David Irving’s suit to clear his reputation of the charge of being a Holocaust 
revisionist is a good example. See Richard J. Evans, Lying about Hitler: History, 
Holocaust and the David Irving Trial (2001). One of the most significant cases in 
Australia in recent years involved developers suing a wide range of critics of a plan to 
build a bridge to Hindmarsh Island, South Australia. We leave it to the reader to apply 
backfire analysis to this case. See Debra Jopson, ‘A Bridge Writ Large’, Sydney 
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We have used cases from Australian and British jurisdictions where 
defamation law is widely seen as friendly to plaintiffs and hostile to free 
speech.15 However, the backfire framework should apply anywhere 
defamation actions can potentially be perceived as oppressive. SLAPPs 
(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation), which are commonplace in 
the US, appear to fit the backfire model quite well.16 Similarly, the backfire 
model can be used to analyse legal actions, other than defamation, that are 
perceived as oppressive, such as the many types of legal action classified as 
SLAPPs. 
 
It is worth emphasising that our analysis looks only at actions and their 
effects, not at motivations of the participants. For example, in looking at the 
first method of inhibition, cover-up, we examine ways in which actions taken 
by participants on one or both sides have the effect of limiting wider 
awareness of defamation actions and their consequences; this examination 
does not make assumptions about the motivations of the participants to cover 
up or reveal the activities. The very term ‘cover-up’ refers to cover-up as a 
consequence, not as an intention. This agnosticism about motivations is a 
general feature of backfire analysis, in which the focus is on the effects of 
actions. This is compatible with the view that everyone has the best of 
intentions.17 
                                                                                                                    
Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 March 1999, 14; ABC Radio National, ‘Hindmarsh 
Island Defamation’, The National Interest, 14 December 2003, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/natint/stories/s1009598.htm> at 22 June 2006; Is This 
Website Defamatory? (2004) Kumarangk Legal Defence Fund 
<http://green.net.au/hindmarsh/defamation.htm> at 22 June 2006; Tricky Legal 
Business: The Impact of Legal Processes on the Campaign Against the Hindmarsh 
Island Bridge (24 October 1998) Kumarangk Legal Defence Fund 
<http://green.net.au/hindmarsh/tricky.htm> at 22 June 2006. 
15 On defamation matters in Australia, see Michael Newcity, ‘The Sociology of 
Defamation in Australia and the United States’ (1991) 26 Texas International Law 
Journal 1; Robert Pullan, Guilty Secrets: Free Speech and Defamation in Australia 
(1994); Brian Walters, Slapping on the Writs: Defamation, Developers and 
Community Activism (2003). On defamation matters in Britain, see Eric Barendt, 
Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson, Libel and the Media: 
The Chilling Effect (1997); Fiona J L Donson, Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the 
Face of Democracy (2000); David Hooper, Reputations under Fire: Winners and 
Losers in the Libel Business (2000). 
16 George Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out (1996). 
See also Seth Goodchild, ‘Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance to Modern 
Libel Law’ (1986) 75 Georgetown Law Journal 315. 
17 Roy F Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (1997) argues that 
usual perceptions of evildoers as malevolent or uncaring are wrong, and that instead 
they see themselves as victims or as justified in their actions. 
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A Avon Lovell and The Mickelberg Stitch 
 
In 1982, in a spectacular case in Western Australia, three brothers — Ray, 
Peter and Brian Mickelberg — were sentenced to prison for swindling gold 
from the Perth Mint. In 1985, journalist Avon Lovell published a book 
entitled The Mickelberg Stitch,18 in which he argued that the prosecution case 
against the Mickelbergs was based on questionable evidence. In other words, 
Lovell alleged the police had framed the brothers. With a big print run of 
20,000, The Mickelberg Stitch sold rapidly in Perth until police threatened to 
sue the book’s distributor and any bookseller or other business offering it for 
sale. The Police Union introduced a $2 per week levy on its 5000 members to 
fund 40 legal actions against Lovell, the distributor and retailers. The 
defamation threats and actions effectively suppressed any general availability 
of the book. None of the suits against Lovell reached trial in over a decade; 
they remained active despite his repeated attempts to strike them out for lack 
of prosecution.  
 
Eventually all suits were dropped in a settlement that was financially generous 
for Lovell and made no restrictions on distribution of the book. Lovell later 
convinced a retired detective, Tony Lewandowski, to publicly admit his role 
in framing the Mickelbergs by fabricating confessions. The convictions of the 
three brothers were quashed on appeal in 2004.19 
 
Cover-up is central to this example. The police suits served to suppress 
availability of and publicity about Lovell’s book and also discouraged media 
attention to the cover-up process. According to Lovell (personal 
communication, 13 November 2004), he was devalued through the 
presumption of the courts that the police were right and he was wrong. In 
addition, he says police spread rumours to journalists that he was not a real 
journalist, was involved in compromising sexual affairs and so forth. The suits 
reinterpreted the issue from a debate about an alleged police frame-up to a 
legal matter. The official channels of the legal system were the method of 
attack: Lovell was tied up by the suits (including countersuits, there were 
eventually 82 actions), making over 1000 court appearances in a decade. The 
actions served as a method of intimidating any author, publisher or bookseller 
that might have wanted to pursue the story. According to Lovell, other 
methods of intimidation were used against him, including loosening wheel  
 
                                                 
18 Avon Lovell, The Mickelberg Stitch (1985). See also Avon Lovell, Split Image: 
International Mystery of the Mickelberg Affair (1990) 
19 Andrea Mayes and David King, ‘Court Quashes Brothers’ Convictions for 1982 
Perth Mint Swindle’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 3-4 July 2004, 8. 
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bolts on his car, which could have led to a serious accident. Thus all the 
methods of inhibiting outrage were present in this case.  
 
Lovell’s many court appearances did little to amplify outrage. On the other 
hand, by convincing Lewandowski to admit to a police frame-up, Lovell was 
dramatically successful in reopening public discussion of the case. Lovell’s 
most effective counter to the defamation suits therefore was publicity, not 
court appearances. 
 
B Robert Askin 
 
Robert Askin was premier of New South Wales from 1965 to 1975. Among 
journalists and others, he was widely known to be involved in criminal 
activities, but the media were unwilling to publish anything about this due to 
Australia’s restrictive defamation laws. Shortly after Askin died in 1981, The 
National Times — a weekly newspaper that featured much investigative 
journalism — published a story by journalist David Hickie titled ‘Askin: 
Friend to Organised Crime’. The opening paragraphs of this article give ample 
testimony to the power of defamation law to inhibit free speech: 
 
Sir Robert Askin was an underestimated man. The mark he left on this country 
was considerable — and has never publicly been discussed. While Sir Robert 
Askin was in power, organised crime became institutionalised on a large scale 
in New South Wales for the first time. Sydney became, and has remained, the 
crime capital of Australia. Askin was central to this. His links with three major 
crime figures [Perce] Galea, close friend Joe Taylor and another, allowed the 
transformation of Sydney’s baccarat clubs into fully-fledged casinos. 
Askin’s links with corrupt police allowed these casinos and SP [starting price] 
betting to flourish. The corrupt police included commissioners Allan and 
Hanson.  
According to a reliable source very high in the old Galea empire, Askin and 
Hanson were paid approximately $100,000 each in bribes a year from the end 
of the Sydney gang wars in 1967-68 until Askin’s retirement. The source is 
impeccable. This information has not been available for The National Times to 
use until Askin’s death… 
Only now that Askin is dead can the recent history of NSW be explored 
publicly. It is not a time for holding back, despite the distress these revelations 
may cause Askin’s colleagues and family. 
Such are the laws of defamation in this country, that only a royal commission 
or parliamentary debate could fully protect public discussion about the Askin 
years while the man lived. Recent commissions into organised crime have 
never dealt publicly with Askin’s role.20 
                                                 
20 David Hickie, ‘Askin: Friend to Organised Crime’ The National Times (Sydney), 
13-19 September 1981, 1. 
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The article went on to give details about criminal operations in New South 
Wales and Askin’s role in them.21 Subsequently, there was a major debate in 
the Sydney Morning Herald about Askin’s personal involvement, such as 
whether he had regularly received bundles of cash in brown paper bags, but 
there seemed no disagreement about the expansion of criminal activity during 
his term as premier. This case clearly shows how defamation law can inhibit 
open discussion of matters of great public import. 
 
This case reveals several methods by which outrage over the injustice of this 
process was inhibited. The likelihood that Askin would sue for defamation 
served to intimidate the media. Neither Askin nor the media discussed this 
likelihood, so the role of defamation law was covered up, as were Askin’s 
activities. After Askin’s death, The National Times explicitly linked 
defamation law and cover-up; the alternative interpretation, built into the law 
itself, is that the key issue was protection of Askin’s reputation. Defamation 
law was the official channel by which free speech was inhibited. As noted in 
the article, ways around the law, such as comment in parliament protected by 
parliamentary privilege, were not used. Askin, as leader of the government, 
would have had formidable power to attack parliamentary critics. The only 
technique of inhibiting outrage not obviously involved was devaluation; it was 
less relevant because cover-up was so effective.  
 
It is worth noting that in this case, defamation law was only one of the means 
for covering up discussion of criminal activity. When organised crime and 
corrupt police are involved, anyone who speaks out can be in jeopardy, as 
illustrated in the following extract from Hickie’s article: 
 
In April 1967 Askin was handed a statutory declaration by a Mr B. Ng 
containing allegations of police complicity with members of organised crime 
syndicates in Sydney’s Chinatown involved in unlicensed gambling, smuggling 
of narcotics and counterfeit money. 
The Ng controversy lasted for two years. Ng and his lawyer were harassed and 
even threatened with death. At last Askin refused an inquiry into Chinatown — 
on the basis of a report from [Police] Commissioner Allan. 
Hatton [John Hatton, independent member of state parliament] subsequently 
told parliament that independent opinions obtained from Ken Marks QC … and 
two other leading interstate counsel had concluded that Allan’s report was a 
‘carefully compiled and intelligent whitewash that should be categorised as 
dishonest and a derogation of duty to the public to ventilate serious matters.’22 
                                                 
21 Hickie later explored Askin’s criminal connections in more depth in David Hickie, 
The Prince and the Premier: The Story of Perce Galea, Bob Askin and the Others 
Who Gave Organised Crime its Start in Australia (1985). 
22 Hickie, above n 20, 8. 
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The Ng episode illustrates the use of both intimidation and official 
channels to inhibit outrage. 
 
C John Marsden 
 
John Marsden was one of a group of prominent Sydney figures rumoured to 
be engaged in paedophilia. Channel Seven, one of the principal Australian 
television networks, aired specific allegations against Marsden in two 
programmes in 1995 and 1996.23 Marsden was a well known and, in some 
eyes, an infamous character on the Sydney scene. As a solicitor his name had 
been associated with many high-profile court cases. He was a past president 
of the New South Wales Law Society and had been a member of the Police 
Board. He moved amongst a powerful elite as an open homosexual.  
 
After the Channel Seven broadcasts, Marsden sued for defamation, denying 
the allegations and claiming he would clear his reputation in court. However, 
what he thought would be a quick victory turned into a public saga, expanding 
into Australia’s longest ever defamation case.24 
 
The entire process, including initial injunctions against Channel Seven, the 
defamation trial and various appeals, lasted over six years. Channel Seven and 
other media publicised the court proceedings and the evidence from 
witnesses, keeping the details of the allegations against Marsden in the public 
eye. 
 
By the time the court finally found against Channel Seven and awarded 
Marsden damages and costs, the damage had been amplified beyond  
 
                                                 
23 The programmes were Today Tonight, 13 March 1995, and Witness, 7 May 1996. 
See Kate McClymont, ‘Marsden’s Bitter-sweet Victory: ‘Forever Tainted’’ (28 June 
2001) Sydney Morning Herald 1; ABC Radio, ‘Defamation Case Has Ruined my Life 
and Reputation: Marsden’, 7.30 Report, 20 July 2000, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s154345.htm> at 22 June 2006. 
24 Marsden commenced action against Channel Seven (Amalgamated Television 
Services) on 14 March 1995, when he sought to restrain it from broadcasting a second 
programme (Witness, actually broadcast in 1996). The main defamation action, which 
began in February 1999, concerned allegations made in a segment of the 13 March 
1995 Today Tonight broadcast. See John Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services 
Pty Ltd S.96/004 (Unreported, High Court of Australia, Gummow J, 2 & 3 May 
1996). The final judgement was handed down in June 2001: Marsden v Amalgamated 
Television Services Pty Ltd 510 (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Levine J, 
2001). 
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salvation.25 Technically Marsden had won the case but both his reputation and 
his health had been severely damaged, and along the way he was financially 
stretched.26 His reputation was not restored by the victory, which has been 
described as ‘pyrrhic.’27 
 
We now examine the five methods of inhibiting outrage and the 
corresponding methods of amplifying outrage in relation to this case. 
 
Cover-up 
Usually media organisations do not publicise defamation actions against 
themselves. In this case Seven took the opposite tack. It led with the 
allegations against Marsden and continued to publicise the trial and details of 
the unfolding evidence. Other media, protected by the qualified privilege of 
being able to report court proceedings and enticed by the controversial public 
persona of Marsden, followed suit. New witnesses and police evidence were 
brought forward throughout the trial. In the course of this, myriad details of 
Marsden’s life and personal proclivities came under the microscope. 
 
By the end of the trial the initial allegations and the unfolding details of 
Marsden’s life were being broadcast and discussed far beyond the original, 
mainly Sydney-based, audience for the initial programs aired by Channel 
Seven. Marsden observed that he ‘never thought it would be like this. I 
thought it would be over in six weeks.’28 
 
Devaluation of the target 
While Channel Seven came under some scrutiny and criticism for its 
journalistic practices and its motives for publicising the allegations against 
Marsden, it was Marsden himself who came under the greatest scrutiny and 
criticism.  
 
Marsden was continually devalued by the unfolding evidence and the 
testimony of witnesses against him and from his own admissions, seen as 
damning in some people’s eyes. He admitted he was promiscuous and used  
 
 
                                                 
25 McClymont, above n 23.  
26 John Marsden, I Am What I Am: My Life and Curious Times (2004) 284, 343, 359. 
27 Channel Nine Television, ‘A Matter of Honour: John Marsden’, Sixty Minutes, 1 
July 2001, 
<http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/sixtyminutes/stories/2001_07_01/story_360.asp
> at 22 June 2006. 
28 ABC Radio, above n 23. 
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drugs. He denied allegations of paedophilia but acknowledged his habit of 
taking casual sexual partners home and not, as he put it, checking their birth 
certificates. 
 
Further, during the course of the trial Marsden approached some of the 
witnesses. The media presented this as an improper way of behaving. 
Marsden argued in his own defence that ‘I was entitled. There’s no fence 
around a witness … I’m a lawyer and I acted properly and with proper 
consideration of the legal requirements.’29 The overall effect of this was to 
devalue the plaintiff rather than the defendant. 
 
Reinterpretation 
Marsden tried to reframe the public and political issues of paedophilia into the 
private and legal issues of protection of reputation. But in this case the 
reframing failed. This was no doubt due to Marsden’s own high profile and 
the public’s salacious interest in details of sexual behaviour that were the 
subject of the trial, combined with Channel Seven’s willingness to use its 
power as a major media organisation to promote its perspective. 
 
Official Channels 
Commissions of inquiry and court cases often work to turn contentious public 
political issues into closed private proceedings, thereby defusing the political 
heat. The Marsden trial had the opposite effect. The legal proceedings made 
what was already sensational even more so by fuelling it with a welter of 
unfolding details about Marsden’s life and practices. 
 
Intimidation  
Far from intimidating Channel Seven, the defamation proceedings gave it 
further opportunity to air the allegations and to publicise material about 
Marsden. There was great public interest in the case and it made good copy. 
Channel Seven had a large team of lawyers and resources to call on for 
handling such legal challenges. 
 
In July 2000, before the end of the legal process, Marsden stated: ‘[i]t’s 
probably totally ruined my life and my health. It’s certainly ruined me 
financially. I’ve lost a lot of friends. I live on medication. I — I go through 
horrendous dreams.’30 Given this assessment, one might conclude it was 
Marsden who was more intimidated by the whole process.  
 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
2006 Defamation and the Art of Backfire 
 
128 
 
In summary, Marsden’s use of defamation proceedings to silence those who 
were criticising him seriously backfired. In this regard, journalist Kate 
McClymont commented that ‘in the cold light of day, the court case — to 
seek compensation for the damage to his reputation — was far more 
damaging and personally humiliating than either of Channel Seven’s two 
programs ever were.’31 Although he won legally, his reputation was further 
damaged. A satirical publication remarked that Marsden should now sue 
himself for defamation.32 Marsden in his autobiography stated that he ‘wanted 
to highlight the failures of the legal system to protect people who have been 
subject to outrageous defamation.’33 
 
Marsden died of cancer in May 2006. Media reports included praise and some 
fierce criticism, including new revelations about sex with underage males.34 
Marsden’s defamation action had created sufficient interest in his behaviour, 
especially in the media, that his reputation came under further attack. This can 
be regarded as an extension of the backfire from his defamation case. 
 
D Geoff Clark 
 
Geoff Clark, an Aboriginal activist, was head of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the highest level Aboriginal peak body 
in Australia. In 2001, the Melbourne newspaper The Age, one of Australia’s 
most prestigious dailies, published a front-page article titled ‘Geoff Clark: 
Power and Rape’35 alleging that in the 1970s and 1980s Clark had raped four 
women. 
 
Clark denied the allegations, claiming The Age ‘have (sic) surpassed the 
bounds of reporting and have constituted themselves (sic) as judge, jury and  
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Kate McClymont, ‘Got the Money, Lost the Name: How John Marsden Won a 
Court Case and Destroyed his own Reputation’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 
June 2001, 13. 
32 ‘Marsden Now to Sue Himself: ‘Court Action Sullied My Reputation’’, (2001) 42 
The Chaser. 
33 Marsden, above n 26, 1. 
34 Among the critical commentaries are Paul Sheehan, ‘Case for the Damnation of 
Marsden’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 22 May 2006, 11; Ron Hicks, ‘Painful 
Memories Hard to Erase’ Weekend Australian, 17 June 2006, 23. 
35 Andrew Rule, ‘Geoff Clark: Power and Rape’ The Age (Melbourne), 14 June 2001, 
1. 
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executioner.’36 In response to accusations that it was conducting a ‘trial by 
media,’ The Age justified its publication of the story by claiming the public 
had a right to know, the allegations were true and Clarke had never been 
brought to trial. The story engendered a lot of public discussion, specifically 
from legal groups, women’s groups, media organisations, journalists and 
Aboriginal groups. The combination of the role of the law, the media, race, 
sexual politics and crime was explosive.  
 
Clark accused the media, particularly the Fairfax company, the owner of The 
Age, of carrying out a campaign of vilification against him and other leaders 
of Aboriginal organisations in order to discredit and destroy Aboriginal 
organisations such as ATSIC and to reduce his personal political position. 
 
Michael Gawenda, the editor of The Age, challenged Clark to use defamation 
proceedings to clear his name and called on the Prime Minister to intervene 
and for Clark to stand down from his position at the head of ATSIC. 
 
Clark did not sue for defamation. He claimed the cost was prohibitive and the 
delay in achieving any outcome would be too great.37 It is reasonable to 
surmise that a defamation suit would have played into the hands of his 
accusers, giving them an opportunity to further publicise the claims and to 
increase sales. In other words, there was a high probability that a defamation 
action would have backfired. By not suing, Clark may well have avoided a 
saga like that endured by Marsden. 
 
E McLibel 
 
The McLibel case is the most famous example of defamation action 
backfiring on the initiator.38 McLibel refers to the case of McDonald’s versus 
two activists, Helen Steel and Dave Morris. In the late 1980s, Steel and  
 
 
                                                 
36 Michelle Tesoriero, ‘Trial by Media’ (July 2002) Reportage (Australian Centre for 
Independent Journalism) <http://www.reportage.uts.edu.au/analysis/geoffclark.html> 
at 22 June 2006. 
37 Debra Jopson, ‘The Power of Silence’ Spectrum, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
8-9 June 2002, 4. 
38 This became the longest running case in British legal history. See Dave Morris, 
‘McLibel: Do-It-Yourself JUSTICE’ (1999) McSpotlight 
<http:/www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/msc_diyjustice.html> at 22 June 2006. For 
an earlier treatment of McLibel in backfire terms — as a censorship backfire — see 
Jansen and Martin, 2003, above n 7. 
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Morris and other members of the anarchist group London Greenpeace39 
produced and distributed a leaflet outside McDonald’s restaurants called 
‘What’s Wrong With McDonald’s: Everything They Don’t Want You to 
Know.’40 The leaflet covered a number of topics including nutrition, labour 
practices, cruelty to animals and environmental damage. McDonald’s sued the 
activists for defamation, claiming numerous statements in the leaflet were 
false.41 
 
McDonald’s was renowned for using defamation actions to silence critics; the 
case against London Greenpeace was but one of its many actions and threats 
over the years.42 Usually McDonald’s had been successful in damping down 
critical comment but this case did not go to plan. Steel and Morris decided to 
stand their ground and fight the action. With only occasional legal advice 
from a pro bono lawyer, they did so on their own and with very limited 
resources. The public interest in McDonald’s and in the issues raised by the 
trial, and particularly in the spectacle of the two individuals standing before 
the onslaught of the financial and legal power of such a powerful corporation, 
increased public attention. 
 
Cover-up 
McDonald’s tried to shut down the activists’ criticisms both by instituting the 
defamation proceedings and in subsequent settlement offers. In media 
statements after the trial began, McDonald’s said it had started the legal action 
to stop the publication of the leaflet and its resultant publicity.43 Two months 
into the trial, McDonald’s contacted the defendants Steel and Morris to try to 
get them to pull out and agree to a settlement. McDonald’s offered to pay ‘a 
substantial sum’ to a mutually agreed third party on the condition that Steel 
and Morris sign a promise to never again make any public criticism of 
McDonald’s. This offer was rejected by Steel and Morris and rejected again a 
year later when McDonald’s repeated the offer.44 As the defendants pointed 
out, ‘[t]he whole reason we are fighting the case was to defend our right to 
criticise them and other multinationals, so we are hardly going to agree to gag 
ourselves.’45  
 
                                                 
39 Not affiliated with Greenpeace International. 
40 See copies of this leaflet on the website <http://www.mcspotlight.org>. 
41 McDonald’s Corporation & McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd. v Helen Steel & David 
Morris [1997] EWHC QB 336. 
42 Donson, above n 15, especially chs 5 & 6. 
43 Ibid 89. 
44 Ibid 91. 
45 John Vidal, McLibel (1997) 126. 
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If McDonald’s aim was to silence criticism, its actions had the effect of 
galvanising it. Massive publicity about the case was generated. A very 
effective support group was established to help with the court case and to 
publicise the issues involved. This was achieved with minimal resources but 
with remarkable organisation. A website, McSpotlight, was set up to give 
people around the world access to details of the trial as it proceeded and 
information about the issues raised.46 The offending leaflet was translated into 
27 languages and was distributed in the millions by bands of people who 
signed up to continue what McDonald’s was trying to prevent. 
 
In the face of the rising publicity, McDonald’s, in desperation, tried to avoid 
media exposure when it could, refusing to speak to some programs and to 
particular journalists.47 
 
McDonald’s efforts at cover-up extended to the court proceedings. The 
corporation made every effort to keep documents and evidence out of the trial, 
The company had evidence presented by Steel and Morris struck out on 
various technical legal grounds, only to have it reinstated when Steel and 
Morris won their appeal against this.48 Morris commented that he and Steel 
had ‘a constant battle to get McDonald’s to hand over all the relevant 
documents in their possession — as they should have done before the case 
began, but were still being forced to do right up to the end.’49 As it turned out, 
the defendants were able to use the court processes to obtain and make public 
many documents damaging to McDonald’s and to cross-examine expert 
witnesses to the same effect.  
 
Devaluation of the target 
A defamation action carries with it the implication that the defendant has done 
something illegal, even reprehensible. McDonald’s attempted to portray the 
activists in this way and to present their criticism as unjustified. McDonald’s 
published its own leaflet attacking the criticisms made in the London 
Greenpeace leaflet and calling the defendants Steel and Morris liars. However  
 
                                                 
46 McSpotlight <http://www.mcspotlight.org>. The site, set up on 16 February 1996, 
was accessed more than one million times in the first month and by mid 2003 the site 
had been accessed over 184 million times. See The McLibel Trial Story (2004) 
McSpotlight <http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/story.html> at 22 June 2006. 
47 A confidential 1995 memo from McDonald’s Australia, leaked to Australian 
television programme Sixty Minutes, said ‘We could worsen the controversy by 
adding our opinion’: Morris, above n 38. 
48 Donson, above n 15, 88.  
49 Morris, above n 38.  
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this representation did not stand up to public scrutiny. The corporation itself 
was devalued for its bullying tactics which were apparent to the public; 
furthermore, the inequality in financial and legal resources offended many 
people’s sense of fair play. The importance of free speech in a democracy was 
at issue and the corporation appeared to be attempting to suppress a public 
right. The public’s image of McDonald’s was lowered and that of the 
defendants was enhanced. 
 
Reinterpretation 
McDonald’s, through its legal action, attempted to recast the issue as one 
protection of reputation. The defendants were far more successful in 
portraying the issue as one of free speech versus censorship. Helen Steel, in 
her submission to the court stated that: ‘We feel there is one word that can 
sum up what this case is about, and that is censorship. McDonald’s is using 
the libel laws of this country to censor and silence their critics.’50 
 
Official Channels 
The use of official channels reverberated against McDonald’s. Its reputation, 
which was technically being protected in court, was impugned for the very act 
of initiating the defamation action. The corporation’s use of this channel to 
attack was obvious to the public. The attempt to turn a public issue into a legal 
matter was countered by the defendants and their support group who were 
able to continually keep the issues before the public by publicising the trial 
proceedings. 
 
Intimidation 
Over the years McDonald’s had issued so many threats and legal actions 
against critics that it had created a general fear of the repercussions of 
criticising the corporation.51 The intimidating prospect of defending 
themselves against such a corporation prompted three of the initial five 
activists who were sued in the McLibel case to withdraw and apologise to 
McDonald’s. Helen Steel commented that, ‘It just really stuck in the throat to 
apologise to McDonald’s. I thought it was them that should have been 
apologising to us — well not us specifically, but to society for the damage 
they do to society and the environment.’52 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Donson, above n 15, 98. 
51 McDonald’s Censorship Strategy (2005) McSpotlight 
<http://www.mcspotlight.org/company/other_mclibels/index.html> at 22 June 2006. 
52 ‘The McLibel Trial Story,’ above n 46. 
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When McDonald’s published and distributed its own leaflet against the 
defendants, Steel and Morris counter-sued the corporation for defamation. 
The two defendants stood against the team of corporate lawyers and the 
resources of McDonald’s. Legal commentator Marcel Berlins observed that he 
‘cannot think of a case in which the legal cards have been so spectacularly 
stacked against one party.’53 
 
In legal terms, the original Mclibel case resulted in a mixed outcome for both 
sides. Five of the original claims were considered proven against 
McDonald’s54 and eight were considered unproven. McDonald’s was by this 
time trying to minimise the publicity surrounding the trial and did not pursue 
damages and dropped its claim for costs.55  
 
Although the corporation was awarded damages and technically won on a 
number of legal points, the case was as a public relations disaster. Its action 
against the two activists was viewed by many observers as unfair. The public 
interest in the trial and the issues raised were far reaching. What McDonald’s 
hoped would be a private legal knock down of the two defendants turned into 
what Morris described as a ‘public issue fought and won in the court of public 
opinion and on the street.’56 In summary, the legal action by McDonald’s 
backfired spectacularly. 
 
As a final turn, Steel and Morris took the British government to the European 
Court of Human Rights, claiming their freedom of speech had been curtailed 
because of Britain’s defamation laws. In February 2005 the court upheld their 
claims, ruling that the two activists should have been given legal aid. 
 
IV DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The backfire framework, developed to analyse the dynamics of injustice in a 
range of areas, can be extended to the study of defamation threats and suits. 
There are two key requirements for an action to backfire on its originators: it 
must be perceived as unjust or excessive, and it must be communicated to 
significant audiences. The McLibel case is the best example of defamation  
 
                                                 
53 Morris, above n 38. 
54 The court held that McDonald’s advertisements exploited children, that 
McDonald’s was responsible for cruelty to animals and that it paid low wages and 
was antagonistic to trade unions. 
55 McLibel Trial Judgement (2004) McSpotlight 
<http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/index.html> at 22 June 2006. 
56 Morris, above n 38. 
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action backfire: the high-powered suit by McDonald’s was seen as 
disproportionate to the actions of the two indigent defendants, and a major 
anti-McDonald’s campaign grew up around the case, symbolised by the 
McSpotlight website. 
 
However, most actions do not backfire, even when they have the potential to 
do so. Perpetrators can take a number of types of actions that inhibit outrage: 
cover-up, devaluation of the target, reinterpretation of the action, use of 
official channels, and intimidation and bribery. These types of actions are 
found in a wide variety of situations, including police beatings and wars. They 
are also found in many defamation actions. Cover-up occurs when the 
plaintiff or the defendant, or both, keep the action out of the public eye. 
Sometimes those threatened with defamation actions do not publicise them 
because it is easier to acquiesce than to organise publicity. For example, when 
West Australian police threatened bookshops selling Avon Lovell’s book The 
Mickelberg Stitch, it is understandable that they might just acquiesce: their 
main business was selling books, not opposing censorship.  
 
Devaluation of the target is implicit in the charge of defamation, because the 
defendant is alleged to be engaged in illegal activity. Inside the court, efforts 
to demonstrate the defendant’s malice can cause devaluation. Additional 
devaluation often occurs behind the scenes through circulation of rumours. In 
cases that backfire, it is the reputation of the plaintiff that suffers, as in the 
McLibel case and also John Marsden’s disastrous suit against Channel Seven. 
 
Reinterpretation of the action is built into the charge of defamation: the 
defendant frequently claims to have been exercising free speech; the suit 
redefines the action as an attack on reputation.  
 
Defamation actions use the legal system as a means of attack. Given that laws 
and courts are widely perceived as providing justice, this provides a powerful 
means of legitimating the attack and inhibiting outrage.  
 
Finally, defamation actions are potent means of intimidation. Indeed, merely 
the threat of a defamation action often operates to inhibit people from 
speaking out. Intimidation thus links closely with cover-up. Bribery also plays 
a role: a settlement often reduces a defendant’s incentive to act against the 
injustice of a defamation suit, and the silencing clauses in many settlements 
enforce cover-up. 
 
Importantly, two of the key means of inhibiting outrage are inherent in 
defamation law: the interpretation that the issue is one of reputation and the  
 
2006 Defamation and the Art of Backfire 
 
135 
 
fact that defamation law has the status of law, with all the advantages of 
official credibility that attach to that. It is also significant that defamation 
suits, and sometimes just threats, intimidate many people. 
 
If there are five methods of inhibiting outrage, then by turning each one on its 
head we arrive at five methods of countering inhibition: publicise the action, 
validate the worth of the target, interpret the action as a violation of free 
speech, discredit the courts as a means of obtaining justice (at least in relation 
to free speech and reputation), and refuse to be intimidated or bribed. As a 
result of the huge personal commitment by the defendants Steel and Morris, 
as well as the efforts of their supporters, the McLibel case illustrates each of 
these counter-measures. 
 
Legal attacks can be turned into opportunities for the defence, either in court57 
or in the public domain. More generally, the backfire framework points to 
those tactics that are most effective for plaintiffs and those that work best for 
their opponents. The framework offers some object lessons for those who are 
rich and powerful: be careful about suing when the action can be perceived as 
excessive and when there is someone who will mount a determined resistance. 
Large corporations have already learned from McDonald’s public relations 
disaster. 
 
For individuals inclined to sue media organisations for attacks on their 
reputations, there is a great risk: the ensuing case can be used to further 
damage one’s reputation, sometimes dramatically. This is the lesson from 
John Marsden’s suit against Channel Seven: he won the legal case but ended 
up with his reputation damaged far more than before. Geoff Clark, who was 
seriously defamed in the media, decided not to sue, thus avoiding this risk. 
 
For free speech advocates, the backfire model gives guidance on tactics. A 
key message is to take the issues to wider audiences, thereby resisting cover-
up and intimidation. As well, taking the issue to wider audiences reduces the  
 
                                                 
57 Greg Ogle (personal communication, 10 November 2004) suggests a number of 
tactics for defendants that use a backfire dynamic: 
• making a counterclaim based on an affidavit filed by the plaintiff; 
• drawing on an affidavit filed by the plaintiff to seek documents through discovery; 
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narrowing of the issue to the legal forum, where plaintiffs have the advantage 
of legal legitimacy. In the words of one commentator, ‘Once you start 
thinking of the case as a legal matter rather than a political issue, you have 
started to lose — politically and legally.’58 
 
                                                 
58 Greg Ogle, ‘The Bush Lawyer’s Guide to Responding to Legal Threats and 
Litigation’ <http://users.senet.com.au/~gregogle/Responding.html> at 22 June 2006. 
